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Abstract 
The study examines attitudes about public religion in the Netherlands, Britain, France and Denmark using ISSP 
survey data for 1998 and 2008. The context is de-privatization of religion in secular Western Europe due to 
Christian cultural defence. The majority of Dutch and British participants hold moderate opinions about mixing 
religion and politics. The majority of French and Danish participants are against public religion. Comparing 
2008 to 1998, anti-public-religion attitudes are more evident in the Netherlands in 2008. It is moderate attitudes 
that are less likely in Britain and approval is even less likely in France and Denmark in 2008 compared to 1998. 
Overall, public religion has become more unpopular in all four countries. In terms of differences between 
religious constituencies within countries, attitudes about public religion have de-coupled from churchgoing in 
Britain unlike continuing relative approval of churchgoers elsewhere. Non-attendance of services is associated 
with disapproval in France only. In the Danish case, majorities express anti-public-religion attitudes across all 
religious constituencies in 2008, including Danish churchgoers. National differences emphasize differing 
traditions, church-state relations and current conditions. There are two instances of cultural defence in our 
analysis. The Dutch case represents growth in religious-Christian numbers outside of the churches who are not 
against public religion. The other instance of religio-ethnic cultural defence is among a growing minority of 
nominal Christians in Britain, who are neither religious nor churchgoers, but express approval of mixing religion 
and politics as part of an imagined national identity rather than any basis in Christian faith. 
Keywords: public religion, politics, Western Europe, cultural defence, Christian identity 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of the study is to compare changing attitudes among the populace in Western Europe about the 
place of religion in public life, and not only among remaining religiously committed minorities, but also among 
those religious constituencies that now lie between churchgoing Christian and secular society (Voas 2009). 
Under processes of modernization the prevailing view had been that religion in Western Europe would inevitably 
retreat from the public sphere (Bruce 2011) with religion’s decline in social significance being the core tenet of 
the secularization paradigm (Wilson 1982). However, others pointed to countertrends where new forms of public 
religion had emerged in the modern world to force a reconsideration of the relation between religion and 
modernity, such as during the 1980s with the growth of the Catholic liberation theology in Latin America or 
Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of the post-revolutionary Republic of Iran. Their argument was 
that around the world religious traditions had re-emerged from the private sphere into public life, causing the 
de-privatization of religion (Casanova 1994). Inglehart and Norris (2012) also observed that on a global scale 
religiosity persisted rather than the local decline seen in Western Europe. Even in Western Europe, Kaufmann, 
Goujon and Vergrad (2012) envisage a future socio-demographic scenario in which immigration and differential 
fertility would result in conservative Christians and people of other world religions, mostly Islam, representing 
the major religious constituencies in the long run. 
1.1 Public Religion and the State in Western Europe 
Religion’s compartmentalization and reduced significance in public life in countries such as the Netherlands, 
Britain, France or Denmark had come about through different historical accommodations between religion and 
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the state, reached in different ways and following different trajectories (Martin, 1978). However, global trends 
have meant that Western European societies have become ‘immigrant nations’ (Scheffer, 2012) with concomitant 
ethnic and religious diversity. British ‘multiculturalism’, French ‘secularism’ and Germanic 
‘Christian-occidentalism’ have all been problematic as responses of the modern state, particularly in the case of 
Islam, up to the point where liberalism may ‘submerge under resurgent nationalism’ (Joppke, 2009: 2). 
Historically, liberalism’s home ground in Western Europe had been the containment of religious conflict. 
In the Netherlands, for example, multiculturalism has lost favour amid heated public debate in the 1990s about 
failed integration of minorities and particularly the incompatibility of Islam with Dutch civic state culture and 
identity. The mainstream Dutch political focus is now ‘assimilation’ and concern about ethnicity and religion 
(Vasta 2007). One might have anticipated Dutch conservative Christian reactions to the state’s original policy of 
multiculturalism, as being too accommodating of the demands and sensitivities of other minority religions such 
as Islam at the expense of established church-state relations in the Netherlands, especially when Dutch Christians 
had come to represent a minority themselves by the 1990s. Achterberg and colleagues (2009) found that over the 
period from 1970 to the mid-1990s the populace’s attitudes about public religion had become increasingly 
polarized between secular and Christian religious blocs within Dutch society. Thereafter Islam in the Netherlands 
was much confused with religious fundamentalism and extremism in the heated public debate about civic society. 
There were, for example, with death threats issued to politicians following the murder in Amsterdam of the 
maker of a documentary film about violence towards women in Islamic countries (Brown, 2004).    
The British and French cases also emphasize differing religion-state relations and responses to new ethnic and 
religious diversity. Even if religion and the state are supposed to be separate within French republicanism (laic), 
Christianity and Judaism enjoy certain privileges and corporate status which have only recently, if haltingly, been 
expanded to Islam. The example of state responses to the Islamic veil is used by Joppke (2009) to hold a mirror 
up to British and French forms of liberalism, and public debate about reassessments of what it means to be a 
‘British’ or ‘French’ citizen. He notes that British multiculturalism risks toleration of illiberal religious excess; 
while French secularism risks repression. Two Muslim women were arrested for publically wearing the niqab in 
a symbolic act by the French state (Schofield, 2011). 
British multiculturalism was presented by Tony Blair’s government in the late 1990s as the means by which the 
state could work together in partnership with religious communities for social inclusion. In practical terms, it 
was used by the government to set the agenda by which it managed issues of ethnic and religious diversity 
(Beckford, 2012). Religious conservatives claimed that British Christian tradition was being marginalized and 
Christians persecuted by the state for public expressions of faith (Glendinning and Bruce, 2011). When an 
opposition coalition government came to power its Prime Minister was quick to brand multiculturalism a failure. 
As one instance, an English High Court judge had ruled that the custom of saying Christian prayers before 
meetings of Bideford Town Council in Devon was unlawful. Legal action came about through the objections of a 
secular member of the council. The government’s English Local Government Secretary responded to the 
decision by fast-tracking legislation to allow local councils to choose whether or not to say traditional Christian 
prayers at their meetings (LocalGovUK, 2012). 
The Danish case of Christian-occidentalism is different again. More than 80 percent of the Danish population 
belong to the Folk Church by virtue of not opting out of paying the annual Church Tax levied by the state on the 
national church’s behalf, but few Danes are either devout or regular churchgoers. Jenkins (2008) explains how 
Christian religion persists in everyday life in Denmark through a process of ‘believing in belonging’ in a paraphrase 
of Grace Davie’s (1994) well-worn characterization of the modern British religious condition as ‘believing without 
belonging.’ Jenkins means by his phrase a common Danish identity of which belonging to the Folk Church is an 
integral part but which need not include any particular belief in Christian doctrines or authority. For most Danes, 
being Christian requires no commitment other than church membership by default (an opt-out annual Church Tax) 
and the occasional church attendance for private rites of passage, such as funerals, baptisms, confirmations and 
weddings. (Bruce, 2000). The Danish Lutheran Church has become a symbol of national and ethnic identity which 
Danes retain to signal their cultural heritage. Islam in particular has been seen as incompatible with such Danish 
culture and the religious ‘other’ has become controversial in Denmark too. As perhaps the most high profile 
instance, the Copenhagen offices of a national weekly were burned down after it commissioned and published ten 
cartoons portraying the Prophet explicitly to assert the newspaper’s right to a free press (Brown, 2006). 
1.2 Cultural Defence among Different Religious Constituencies 
There are three recurrent themes in our accounts of Dutch, British, French and Danish experiences: first, seeming 
disruptions to the established accommodations between religion and the state that had contained previous 
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religious conflict; second, perceived encroachments by a more overtly secularist state on the position of the 
Christian churches in order to re-accommodate and manage the new public presence of an assertive religious 
‘other’; and third, perceived threats to Christian religio-ethnic national identities from that new presence. 
However, Western European societies are even more religiously diverse than that because new religious 
constituencies also exist outside of traditional Christian, conservative Islamic and other congregations of 
committed adherents. David Voas’ analysis of survey data collected across Europe in 2002/2003 suggests there 
are also a variety of religious constituencies who are ‘neither regular churchgoers nor self-consciously 
non-religious’ (Voas, 2009: 155). He found that many Europeans now occupied a religious space between the 
churches and the secular, a religious space where people’s ‘loyalty to tradition’ remained ‘considerable’ in his 
words, which is where the crossover occurs with Christian religio-ethnic national identities.  
Ingrid Strom’s analysis of what exactly Voas’ space of ‘residual’ religious involvement comprised suggested that 
it included constituencies representing nationalist-religious-ethnocentrism and individualist-religious-pluralism 
(Storm, 2009: 707—8).i On the contentious matter of immigration, for example, Storm (2011a) later found that 
those people who believed it was important to be Christian to be ‘Dutch’ or ‘British’ or ‘Danish’ were more 
likely to hold negative attitudes about immigrants as ‘a serious threat to national identity’. ii  However, 
thosenegative attitudes of nominal Christians were quite different from the attitudes of churchgoers. 
Churchgoing even reduced anti-immigration attitudes in the Netherlands and Denmark, as representing Christian 
tolerance. Strom found that a negative view of Muslims was a further factor in expressions of national identity as 
‘Dutch’ or ‘British’ or ‘Danish’ but differently in each of the three countries: being born in the Netherlands was 
important among the Dutch; white ethnicity was important among the British; while being a member of the Folk 
Church was important among the Danes. 
Storm’s alignment of a Christian identity with other aspects of national identity can be seen as representing a 
religio-ethnic group outside of the Christian churches that coheres through ethno-cultural solidarity, and also, by 
reference to the new presence of the ‘non-Christian (especially Muslim) other’. In particular, Storm found that 
thinking it was important to be Christian to be British was associated with ethnic national identity (2011b). 
Apologists for the secularization paradigm have framed perceived threats to national religio-ethnic identity as 
‘cultural defence’ (Bruce, 2011: 50—2). 
1.3 Research Question 
Do Western Europeans wish religion to have a new prominence in public life? Our central argument is that if public 
religion is not popular among the new variety of religious constituencies in the Netherlands, Britain, France and 
Denmark (which are countries with distinctive histories, church-state relations and current religious conditions)and 
if public religion became less rather than more popular after 2000 (when religion became more controversial, more 
confused with extremism and national religio-ethnic identities more threatened) then it seems unlikely that we are 
witnessing any desire for de-privatization of religion in Western Europe. Certainly we would expect to see national 
variations — greater or lesser religious-secular divides in attitudes; stronger or weaker effects of religious identities, 
personal religiosity and churchgoing; and differing expressions of Christian cultural defence — but we also expect 
our general point about the widespread lack of popularity of public religion to apply to almost all religious 
constituencies within different forms of Western European liberalism. 
2. Methods 
2.1 Secondary Data Source 
The study utilizes International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) cross-sectional national samples from 1998 
and 2008. ISSP surveys in those particular years included modules of questions on religion (ISSP 1998; 2008). 
The approach adopted extends one developed in a previous study of Britain alone (Glendinning and Bruce 2011). 
As with its predecessor, the study examines attitudes about the public presence of religion but in four Western 
European liberal democracies.
iii
 
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1 Attitudes about Public Religion 
In the previous study by Glendinning and Bruce a pre-analysis of a block of six relevant ISSP questions 
identified two particular questions as especially pertinent. The two questions were used to form a reliable 
measure of attitudes about religion’s involvement in politics (2011: 508). The scale combined responses to the 
agreement statements: ‘religious leaders should not try to influence: (a) government decisions; and (b) how 
people vote in elections.’ Results were cross-checked with another question available in 2008 only. In the present 
study questions (a) and (b) and the associated scale are used to represent anti, moderate and pro-public-religion 
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attitudes among ISSP participants in the Netherlands, Britain, France and Denmark in 1998 and 2008. We usean 
ordinal version of the scale to meet various statistical assumptions behind the application of multivariate 
regression techniques.Further details are provided in Tables 1 and 3. 
2.2.2 Religious Factors 
As previously, we analyze ISSP participants’ self-reports of their frequency of attendance of services and 
meetings associated with their religion, if any, along with self-reports of religious identity, including ‘no 
religion’. However, the present study includes an additional measure of personal religiosityexpressed in terms of 
self-assessments of how religious or non-religious ISSP participants’ believed themselves to be on a five-point 
scale. All three questions are handled in a standard format. In the case of Britain only, there are sufficient data to 
separate out those participants who claim a Christian identity but do not ‘belong to any particular religion’ from 
those participants who identify with a particular religious denomination, and others who have ‘no religion’ at 
all.Further details are provided in Table 2. 
2.2.3 Social Factors 
Our study also includes consideration of key social factors. Age is aggregated into three groups to represent 
‘younger’ 18—34 year-olds, ‘middle-aged’ 35—54 year-olds and ‘older’ 55 plus years participants. Cohort 
effects may be derived from year of survey and age-group. Education systems are distinctive in the four 
countries. For comparisons the two highest educational categories in the ISSP datasets for each country are 
combined to represent those who possess education beyond high school, as university and college graduates 
compared to other participants.   
2.3 Plan of Analysis 
In what follows we provide preliminary results in a tabular format, first for changes in the populace’s attitudes 
about religion’s involvement in politics in 2008 compared to 1998 (Table 1), then for national changes in levels 
of religious participation, personal religiosity and religious identification (Table 2) and finally for changes in 
attitudes about religion’s involvement in politics more specifically among different religious constituencies in 
each of the four countries (Table 3). Once that descriptive groundwork has been laid, our three religious factors 
are entered into multivariate analyses in order to examine their effects jointly on the populace’s attitudes about 
public religion in the different countries, and also changes in those attitudes within and between different 
religious blocs in 2008 compared to 1998 (Table 4). Regression analyses control for social factors affecting 
religion, namelygender, age and education. Regression analyses are run for each country separately.
iv
 Further 
analyses are required for the Netherlands and Britain to elaborate on those two particular cases (Table 5). 
One of the benefits of undertaking regression analyses is that we are able, after all, to estimate differences in 
attitudes about public religion between different religious constituencies in each country, such as: secular 
participants; religiously indifferent participants; those who ‘believe without belonging’; those who ‘belong 
without believing’; and religious-Christians. We can estimate differences between religious constituencies while 
making allowances for effects which are due to participation or non-participation in organised religion in terms 
of churchgoing. Logically, there are further categories to consider but numbers in such categories are typically 
small (Glendinning 2006), except in the particular case of Britain, where in our analysis, we also consider 
differences for nominal British Christians who do not belong to any particular religious denomination.  
3. Results 
3.1 Religion’s Involvement in Politics 
Table 1 reports preliminary results about attitudes in the Netherlands, Britain, France and Denmark in 2008 and 
1998. Results are for questions (a) and (b) by country and year. British and Dutch replies to the same questions at 
an earlier sweep of the ISSP are for reference only, because France and Denmark did not participate in 1991. 
3.1.1 Changing Attitudes about Religion’s Influence on Government Decisions 
Results of chi-squared tests applied to the data in Table 1(a) suggest that in each country the notion that 
‘religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions’ gained ground in 2008 compared to 1998. 
The majority in each country agreed they should not be involved; and ISSP participants were more likely to 
agree in 2008 compared to 1998. For example, 77 percent of Dutch participants disapproved in 2008 compared 
to 67 percent of their counterparts in 1998 (Chi-sq.(4) = 67.92, p < .001). The effect of survey year was weaker 
in Denmark (Chi-sq.(4) = 12.14, p = .016) but most Danes disapproved already (82 percent of the Danish sample 
in 2008 compared to 78 percent in 1998). Chi-squared tests of cross-national differences indicated that 
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disapproval was strongest in Denmark, followed by France, then the Netherlands, and finally, Britain (Country 
differences: Chi-sq.(12) = 501.08, p < .001 in 2008; and Chi-sq.(12) = 400.82, p < .001 in 1998). 
Table 1.Changing attitudes about religion’s involvement in politics. Source: ISSP. 
Column %-ages 1991^ 1998 2008 
Netherlands (a) (b) (a)** (b)** (a)** (b)** 
1. Strongly agree 29% 35% 36% 42% 45% 49% 
2. Agree 37% 38% 31% 33% 32% 33% 
3. Neither/nor 14% 11% 15% 13% 12% 10% 
4. Disagree 16% 12% 14% 9% 7% 5% 
5. Strongly disagree 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 = .75, N = 1,513 = .82, N = 1,949  = .86, N = 1,932 
Britain (a) (b) (a)** (b)** (a)** (b)** 
1. Strongly agree 22% 32% 32% 40% 39% 45% 
2. Agree 39% 42% 32% 32% 30% 31% 
3. Neither/nor 15% 8% 14% 12% 16% 12% 
4. Disagree 17% 11% 16% 10% 10% 6% 
5. Strongly disagree 7% 7% 6% 6% 5% 6% 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 = .69, N = 1,186  = .83, N = 779  = .83, N = 1,931 
France (No ISSP) (a)** (b)NS (a)** (b)NS 
1. Strongly agree – – 56% 66% 57% 66% 
2. Agree – – 17% 18% 20% 18% 
3. Neither/nor – – 15% 9% 14% 10% 
4. Disagree – – 8% 4% 7% 4% 
5. Strongly disagree – – 4% 2% 2% 2% 
 – – 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 = .82, N = 1,119  = .83, N = 2,376 
Denmark (No ISSP) (a)* (b)** (a)* (b)** 
1. Strongly agree – – 65% 72% 69% 78% 
2. Agree – – 13% 11% 13% 8% 
3. Neither/nor – – 9% 8% 9% 7% 
4. Disagree – – 8% 4% 5% 4% 
5. Strongly disagree – – 5% 5% 4% 3% 
 – – 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 = .86, N = 1,111  = .80, N = 1,977 
Notes: Chi-sq. tests of (a) and (b) in 2008 compared to 1998.NSnot sig.; *p < .05; **p < .01 
(a) ‘Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions’ 
(b) ‘Religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections’ 
Cronbach’s alpha for the subscale produced by combining replies to (a) and (b) 
3.1.2 Changing Attitudes about Religion’s Influence on Voting Behaviour 
Those conclusions are replicated in the analysis of ISSP participants’ replies to the second question that 
‘religious leaders should not try to influence how people vote in elections’ in Table 1(b)). Involvement in 
elections seemed to be more unpopular still. Comparing distributions of replies to the two questions, for example 
among Dutch participants in 2008, the appropriate test statistic confirmed that disapproval in the Netherlands 
was stronger about the second question compared to the first question (the value of the marginal homogeneity 
test for paired responses by Dutch respondents in 2008 was 25.16, p < .001). Chi-squared tests show that 
disapproval of attempts to influence elections was stronger also in 2008 compared to 1998. The only exception 
was lack of difference in French replies in 1998 and 2008 (Chi-sq.(4) = 5.80, p = .215) but two-thirds of French 
participants were strongly opposed already (66 percent of the French sample ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement 
in both years). Overall, as with the first question about attempts to influence government, disapproval of attempts 
to influence voting was strongest in Denmark, followed by France, then the Netherlands, and finally, Britain 
(Country differences: Chi-sq.(12) = 709.50, p < .001 in 2008; and Chi-sq.(12) = 444.41, p < .001 in 1998). 
3.2 Religious Identity, Participation in Organised Religion and Personal Religiosity 
A board overview of religion in the four countries in 2008 compared to 1998 is provided by the data in Table 2. 
Estimates for Britain and the Netherlands in 1991 are for reference only. More detail is provided along with 
findings about attitudes when needed. 
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3.2.1 Changing Participation in Organized Religion 
Unlike claims of Christian identity, only modest numbers in any of the national samples reported participating in 
organised religion on a regular basis monthly basis, or more often, and attendance fell in 2008 compared to 1998 
(Table 2(d), Chi-sq. tests). The estimated extent of overall decline in church attendance was of the order of 20 
percent in each country or one-fifth of congregations in 2008 compared to 1998. 
3.2.2 Changing Personal Religiosity 
Separate from any participation in organised religion, self-ratings of personal religiosity fell in Britain, the 
Netherlands and Denmark also and French estimates of self-professed religiosity stayed at the same low level 
between the two years (Table 2(e), Chi-sq. tests). However, on a scale from -2 ‘extremely/very non-religious’ 
through to +2 ‘extremely/very religious’ estimates of religiosity were lowest in France anyway (-0.34 in 2008). 
Estimates were also negative both in Denmark and Britain in 2008 (-0.31 and -0.18, respectively) and personal 
religiosity had a positive mean value in the Netherlands only in 2008 (but +0.08 in 2008 compared to +0.22 in 
1998, t = 2.43, p = .015). 
3.2.3 Changing Religious Identity 
According to the figures in Table 2 the likelihood of claiming a Christian identity remained static in Britain and 
France at around one half of the ISSP samples in 1998 and 2008 (Table 2(c), chi-sq. tests). Nominal Christianity 
remained at a much higher level in Denmark. Danish estimates were three percentage points less in 2008 
compared to 1998 but still at 84 percent of the total ISSP sample in 2008 (a statistically insignificant change, 
Chi-sq.(2) = 5.75, p = .056). The Netherlands is different. Nominal Christian numbers increased by more than 
one-third from 37 percent of the Dutch sample in 1998 to 50 percent in 2008 (Chi-sq.(2) = 99.00, p < .001). That 
is an exceptional result. The presence of other religions increased by 3 percentage points in the Dutch sample (|Z| 
= 3.8, p < .001) in 2008 compared to 1998 and it increased by 2.5 percentage points in the British sample (|Z| = 
3.0, p = .001) in 2008 compared to 1998. For example, Muslims represent 1.5 percent of Dutch participants and 
2.5 percent of British participants in the ISSP samples in 2008. The presence of other religions remained at lower 
levels in the French and Danish samples with small increases only of the order of one half of one percentage 
point in 2008 compared to 1998. 
Table 2.Changing religious identity, participation in organized religion and personal religiosity. Source: ISSP. 
Total %-ages / means 1991^ 1998 2008 
Netherlands    
(c) Christian (%-age)** 42% 37% 50% 
Other religions (%-age)* 4% 5% 8% 
(d) Regular attendance (%-age)** 29% 24% 20% 
(e) Personal religiosity (mean; SD)** 0.21; 1.35 0.22; 1.35  0.08; 1.45 
Bases, N = 1,564 1,947 1,917 
Britain    
(c) Christian+ (%-age)NS 64% 52% 51% 
Other religions (%-age)* 3% 3% 6% 
(d) Regular attendance (%-age)** 22% 20% 17% 
(e) Personal religiosity (mean; SD)** 0.09; 1.14 0.03; 1.16 -0.18; 1.30 
Bases, N = 1,234 789 1,948 
France    
(c) Christian (%-age) – 52% 53% 
Other religions (%-age) NS – 2% 2% 
(d) Regular attendance (%-age)* – 16% 13% 
(e) Personal religiosity (mean; SD) NS – -0.32; 1.24 -0.34; 1.22 
Bases, N = (No ISSP) 1,124 2,374 
Denmark    
(c) Christian (%-age)* – 87% 84% 
Other religions (%-age) NS – 2% 2% 
(d) Regular attendance (%-age)* – 11% 9% 
(e) Personal religiosity (mean; SD)** – -0.12; 1.11 -0.31; 1.12 
Bases, N = (No ISSP) 1,108 1,942 
Notes: Chi-sq. of (c) and (d) and t-tests of (e) in 2008 compared to 1998.NSnot sig.; *p < .05; **p < .01 
(c) Christians including those self-identifying ‘Christian’ but of no denomination.  
(d) Attendance of religious services or meetings on a monthly basis or more often. 
(e) Range -2 ‘extremely/very non-religious’ to +2 ‘extremely/very religious’. 
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+Only in Britain do a substantial number of participants claim a ‘Christian’ identity but do not report a specific religious 
denomination. In terms of change, that number is 33 from 414 (8% of Christians) in 1998 and it increases to 187 from 1,017 
(18% of Christians) in 2008: Chi sq. = 24.54, df = 1, p < .001 
3.2.4 Summary of Religious Change in 2008 Compared to 1998 
To summarize conclusions from Table 2, self-reported participation in organised religion fell in all four countries 
and levels of self-professed religiosity fell too. Thus, we can see evidence for on-going national decline in 
churchgoing and personal religious faith in each country – à la secularization – but importantly, neither in 
Christian identity nor in other religious identities. In particular, there appears to have been a reversal of the long 
decline in claiming a Christian identity in the Netherlands (Achterberg et al. 2009: 696) accompanied by an 
increase in Dutch self-reports of church attendance on an occasional basis in 2008 compared to 1998 (|Z| = +5.3, 
p < .001). 
3.3 Attitudes about Public Religion among Different Religious Constituencies 
Table 3 extends the general overview that was provided in Table 1 by separating out the populace’s attitudes 
about religion’s involvement in politics into different religious blocs, for example to compare attitudes of Dutch 
nominal Christians and churchgoers in 2008 and 1998. ISSP participants’ replies to the two questions in Table 1 
have been combined into a scale
v
 and separated out into three groups in Table 3 to represent anti-, ‘moderate and 
pro-public-religion positions.  
3.3.1 Changing Attitudes and Religious Identities (Preliminary Results) 
The figures and associated chi-squared tests in Table 3(c) suggest that public religion is less popular among 
Christian participants in 2008 compared to 1998 in each country. For example, estimates of anti-public-religion 
attitudes among Christians in the Netherlands increased from 25 percent of the Christian sample in 1998 to 40 
percent of the corresponding sample in 2008 and pro-public-religion attitudes decreased from 20 percent in 1998 
to 12 percent of the corresponding sample in 2008 (Chi-sq.(2) = 45.96, p < .001). Among participants of ‘no 
religion’ the same observation about diminishing support for public religion can be made with confidence in the 
Netherlands only (62 percent of Dutch participants who had no religion expressed negative attitudes in 2008 
compared to 53 percent of their irreligious counterparts in 1998; Ch-sq.(2) = 18.29, p < .001). That situation was 
peculiar to the Netherlands. Changes among participants of ‘no religion’ were statistically insignificant in the 
other countries (Table 3(c), Chi-sq. tests). 
3.3.2 Changing Attitudes and Religious Participation (Preliminary Results) 
In the Dutch case, attitudes about public religion hardened among non-attendees (64 percent of Dutch 
non-attendees expressed anti-public-religion attitudes in 2008 compared to only 51 percent in 1998; Chi-sq.(2) = 
24.48, p < .001). Similarly, in terms of differences among regular churchgoers, statistically speaking, Dutch 
churchgoers stood out. Estimates of anti-public-religion attitudes among the 1998 and 2008 samples of Dutch 
churchgoers were up from 19 to 26 percent in 2008 and estimates of pro-public-religion attitudes were down 
from 27 to 20 percent in 2008 (Chi-sq.(2) = 7.55, p = .023). Dutch participants who went to church on an 
occasional basis repeat that same pattern of relative increase in negative attitudes and decrease in positive 
attitudes as observed among non-attendees and churchgoers in the Netherlands (Table 3(d)). In Britain, France 
and Denmark, attitudes of participants who never went to church were not much different in 2008 compared to 
1998 and changes were statistically insignificant among British, French and Danish regular churchgoers too 
(Tables 3(d), Chi-sq. tests). Occasional churchgoers stood out as exceptional in Denmark only – where 
occasional church attendance represents the majority practice at more than 60 percent of the Danish population – 
with negative attitudes were more likely in 2008 compared to 1998 (Chi-sq.(2) = 24.82, p < .001). Indeed, 
occasional attendees’ negative attitudes had come to match those of Danes who never went to church at all by 
2008 (76 percent of occasional attendees compared to 77 percent of non-attendees). 
Table 3. Attitudes about religion’s involvement in politics by religious identity and participation. Source: ISSP. 
Column %-ages 
 
Netherlands Britain France Denmark 
1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 1998 2008 
(c) Religious identity         
No religion         
-1 Anti-public-religion (1 to 1.5) 53% 62% 44% 49% 78% 79% 71% 75% 
 0 Moderate position (2 to 3) 41% 33% 46% 43% 20% 19% 19% 18% 
 +1 Pro-public-religion (3.5 to 5) 6% 4% 10% 8% 2% 2% 10% 7% 
Bases, N = 1,131 801 355 846 515 1,044 127 274 
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Chi-sq. 2008 v 1998: p < .01 p = .18 p = .95 p = .40 
Christian identity         
-1 Anti-public-religion (1 to 1.5) 25% 40% 30% 37% 46% 48% 70% 74% 
 0 Moderate position (2 to 3) 55% 49% 50% 49% 40% 43% 19% 19% 
 +1 Pro-public-religion (3.5 to 5) 20% 12% 20% 14% 14% 9% 11% 7% 
Bases, N = 718 944 403 984 565 1,205 960 1,609 
Chi-sq. 2008 v 1998: p < .01 p < .01 p = .01 p < .01 
(d) Religious participation         
Never attend         
-1 Anti-public-religion (1 to 1.5) 51% 64% 42% 46% 77% 77% 78% 77% 
 0 Moderate position (2 to 3) 42% 31% 46% 45% 20% 21% 15% 16% 
 +1 Pro-public-religion (3.5 to 5) 7% 5% 12% 9% 3% 2% 7% 6% 
Bases, N = 951 719 457 1,198 543 1,203 311 494 
Chi-sq. 2008 v 1998: p < .01 p = .07 p = .74 p = .80 
Attend less often         
-1 Anti-public-religion (1 to 1.5) 38% 52% 35% 36% 53% 55% 68% 76% 
 0 Moderate position (2 to 3) 52% 42% 50% 51% 39% 39% 21% 19% 
 +1 Pro-public-religion (3.5 to 5) 10% 6% 15% 13% 9% 6% 11% 5% 
Bases, N = 549 669 143 356 360 705 659 1,223 
Chi-sq. 2008 v 1998: p < .01 p = .91 p = .36 p < .01 
Monthly attendance or more often         
-1 Anti-public-religion (1 to 1.5) 19% 26% 21% 28% 26% 25% 56% 56% 
 0 Moderate position (2 to 3) 54% 54% 52% 50% 46% 57% 28% 25% 
 +1 Pro-public-religion (3.5 to 5) 27% 20% 27% 22% 28% 18% 16% 19% 
Bases, N = 389 334 155 267 167 292 111 144 
Chi-sq. 2008 v 1998: p = .02 p = .16 p = .06 p = .62 
Notes: Attitude scale [(a) + (b)]  2: ‘anti-’ (1 to 1.5); ‘Moderate’ (2 to 3); and ‘pro--’ (3.5 to 5) positions. 
For details of measures of attitudes (a) & (b), see Table 1; and of religious factors (c) & (d), see Table 2. 
^Never or hardly ever attend religious services or meetings. 
3.4 Multivariate Analysis of Attitudes about Public Religion 
Table 4 reports the results of four separate multinomial regression analyses.
vi
 The dependent variable is variation 
in anti-, moderate and pro-attitudes about religious leaders’ involvement in politics (where moderate is set as 
reference category). The analyses control for gender, age and education. Tests are made for differences by the 
year of survey, religious identity, participation in organised religion and personal religiosity, considered jointly. 
Results are expressed as regression coefficients that can be used also to estimate relative differences in the 
likelihood of participants’ holding anti- and pro-public-religion attitudes as odds ratios between the two years of 
the survey, or different religious blocs. Further tests are made for possible interaction effects involving the year 
of survey and each of the three religious factors considered. In the event, we did not find any evidence for 
changes between 1998 and 2008 in the nature of associations between attitudes and religious identity, or levels of 
participation in organised religion, or personal religiosity, having controlled for social factors. We did find 
statistically significant main effects of gender, age, education, year of survey, religious identity, self-professed 
religiosity and religious participation, often differently in each of the four countries.  
3.4.1 Effects of Gender, Age-group and Education Level 
It seems that women hold less polarized views than men in Britain and the Netherlands (Table 4, the reference 
group is men, anti-B = 0: British women, anti-B = -.198*; Dutch women, anti-B = -.286**). There is no evidence 
for gender differences in Denmark, but interestingly, France seems quite different from the other countries. 
Women are more likely than men to be negative about public religion in France (Ref. group men, anti-B = 0 & 
pro-B = 0: French women, anti-B = +.261** & French women, pro-B = -.369**). Considering age, younger 
participants are less likely than middle-aged participants to express negative attitudes in the Netherlands, France 
and Denmark (Ref. group middle-age, anti-B = 0: Dutch 18—34 year-olds, anti-B = -.288**; French 18—34 
year-olds, anti-B = -.240*; Danish 18—34 year-olds, anti-B = -.242*). British age-group effects are different 
compared to the other countries: younger participants are less likely than middle-aged participants to express 
positive attitudes in Britain (Ref. group middle-aged, pro-B = 0: British 18—34 year-olds, pro-B = -.716**) 
while older participants appear split in their attitudes (Ref. group middle-aged, anti-B = 0 & pro-B = 0: British 
55+ years, anti-B = +.282** & British 55+ years, pro-B = +.314*). In terms of education, on the whole Danes 
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strongly disapprove of religious leaders’ attempted involvement in politics but Danish graduates are less likely 
than their compatriots to express negative attitudes (Danish graduates, anti-B = -.393**). In addition, British 
graduates are more likely than other Britons to express positive attitudes about public religion (British graduates, 
pro-B = +.296*). Education effects are statistically insignificant in France and the Netherlands. 
Table 4. Multinomial logistic regression models of attitudes about religion’s involvement in politics. Source: 
ISSP. 
Attitude 
-1 = Anti- (1 to 1.5) 
+1 = Pro- (3.5 to 5) 
Netherlands Britain France Denmark 
Anti- 
 (46%) 
Pro- 
 (10%) 
Anti- 
 (40%) 
Pro- 
 (13%) 
Anti- 
 (62%) 
Pro- 
 (7%) 
Anti- 
 (73%) 
Pro- 
 (8%) 
Exp(B) = odds ratio B p B p B p B p B p B p B p B p 
Women [Men = 0] -.286 ** -.206 .09 -.198 * -.256 .06 .261 ** -.369 ** -.046 .64 -.232 .15 
18—34 yrs. [35—54 = 0] -.288 ** .109 .49 -.084 .48 -.716 ** -.240 * -.348 .15 -.242 * -.242 .25 
55+ yrs. [35—54 = 0] .091 .30 -.004 .98 .282 ** .314 * .061 .54 .185 .32 .046 .69 -.071 .70 
Higher educ. [Others = 0] .116 .18 .160 .26 .182 .08 .296 * .043 .64 .308 .06 -.393 ** -.263 .14 
2008 survey [1998 = 0] .343 ** -.257 .05 .053 .60 -.326 * -.105 .26 -.472 ** .183 .08 -.357 * 
Christian [No relig. = 0] -.014 .90 .322 .08 -.364 ** .192 .31 -.409 ** .068 .79 .075 .63 -.309 .21 
Never attend [Less = 0] .193 .05 .127 .51 .221 .09 .042 .83 .391 ** -.165 .49 .151 .23 -.093 .66 
Regularly [Less = 0] -.565 ** .533 ** -.074 .67 .287 .18 -.712 ** .527 ** -.449 ** .508 * 
Religiosity [covariate] -.181 ** .253 ** -.255 ** .024 .75 -.387 ** .191 .05 -.165 ** .103 .22 
Sq-religiosity [quadratic] -.013 .60 .138 ** .044 .22 .165 ** NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Religion × Year of survey^ NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS NS 
Notes: Entry of religious and social factors into regression model.NSstatistically insignificant at  = .05;*p < .05; **p < .01. 
^Tests for changing relationships between religious factors and attitudes in 2008 compared to 1998.  
Moderate (ref. category) (44%)  (47%)  (31%)  (19%) 
Multicollinearity diag. Max(VIF) = 2.16 Max(VIF) = 2.37  Max(VIF) = 2.28 Max(VIF) = 1.35 
Nagelkerke R-sq. R2 = .159 R2 = .091  R2 = .235 R2 = .048 
3.4.2 Effects of the Year of the Survey  
As to attitudes overall in 2008 compared to 1998, there were significant effects of survey year in all four 
countries. Any change in positive attitudes about public religion was statistically insignificant in the Netherlands. 
Rather, Dutch participants were more likely to express negative attitudes in 2008 compared to 1998 (Ref. group 
1998, anti-B = 0: Netherlands 2008, anti-B = +.343**). Meaning overall, Dutch support did not increase but the 
Dutch populace’s attitudes became more polarized in 2008 compared to 1998 as the likelihood of negative 
attitudes increased. In the other three countries participants in Britain, France and Denmark were less likely to be 
positive about public religion in 2008 compared to the reference year 1998 (Table 4, ref. group 1998, pro-B = 0: 
Britain 2008, pro-B = -.326*; France 2008, pro-B = -.472**; and Denmark 2008, pro-B = -.357*). There were no 
statistically significant effects of survey year relating to anti-public-religion attitudes in the three countries, 
meaning overall, support dropped further and attitudes were less polarized among the populace in Britain, France 
and Denmark in 2008 compared to 1998. 
Our regression analyses found no evidence for shifts in the extent of differences in attitudes between religious 
blocs in 2008 compared to 1998 – for example, the divide in attitudes between Dutch secular and Christian blocs 
in 2008 compared to the corresponding divide between Dutch secular and Christian blocs in 1998. In the 
language of statistical modelling, none of the interaction effects tested for entry into the regression models in 
Table 4 could be generalized with confidence (p > .05). The final regression models indicate that attitudes about 
public religion were related in the same way in 2008 and 1998 for different religious blocs and for other social 
factors considered. 
3.4.3 Effects of Participation in Organised Religion 
The effects of regular church attendance were similar in the Netherlands, France and Denmark (Table 4, ref. 
group occasional attendees, pro-B = 0 & anti-B = 0: Dutch churchgoers, anti-B = -.565** & pro-B = +.553**; 
French churchgoers, anti-B = -.712** & pro-B = +.527**; Danish churchgoers, anti-B = -.449** & pro-B = 
+.508*). The regression models indicate that Dutch, French and Danish churchgoers are less likely than 
occasional attendees to express anti-public-religion attitudes and churchgoers are more likely than occasional 
attendees to express pro-public-religion attitudes. Cross-national results are different among participants who 
never go to church in the Netherlands, France and Denmark, for example, non-attendance is not related to 
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pro-public-religion attitudes and anti-public religion sentiment is related to non-attendance in France only (Table 
4, ref. group occasional attendees, anti-B = 0: French non-attendees, anti-B = +.391**). 
The British case stands out as exceptional in terms of participation in organized religion. The regression model in 
Table 4 suggests that any effects of church attendance on attitudes about public religion are statistically 
insignificant in Britain once allowance is made for other factors in the analysis such as gender, age, education, 
religious identity and personal religiosity. 
3.4.4 Effects of Personal Religiosity 
In the particular case of Denmark, as personal religiosity increases the likelihood of holding anti-public-religion 
attitudes decreases in a linear fashion (Table 4, ref. group ‘religiously indifferent’ Danes, anti-B = 0: Danish unit 
increase in religiosity, anti-B = -.165**). In the case of France, as personal religiosity increases the likelihood of 
anti-public-religion attitudes decreases linearly too (French unit increase in religiosity, anti-B = -.387**), but in 
addition, the likelihood of pro-public-religion attitudes increases in a linear fashion at the same time (French unit 
increase in religiosity, pro-B = +.219**). There is a negative linear relationship between personal religiosity and 
anti-public-religion attitudes in the Netherlands and Britain (Dutch unit increase in religiosity, anti-B = -.181** 
and British unit increase in religiosity, anti-B = -.255**), just as found in Denmark and France. 
Associations between pro-public-religion attitudes and level of personal religiosity are statistically insignificant 
in Denmark and France (Table 4, pro-B p > .05). However, the results for pro-public-religion attitudes in the 
Netherlands and Britain are presented in a separate breakout table, Table 5, because the final regression models 
for those two countries involve a quadratic term as well as a linear term in the covariate. 
Table 5. The relationship between level of personal religiosity and likelihood of holding anti- and pro-positions 
about public religion in the Netherlands and Britain (based on regression models). Source: ISSP. 
Attitude about public religion 
-1 = Anti-position (1 to 1.5) 
+1 = Pro-position (3.5 to 5) 
Personal religiosity (PR) 
-2 -1 0 +1 +2 
Netherlands (N = 3,507)       
Anti-B = -.181×(PR) Exp(B) = 1.44 1.20 1.00 .80 .70 
Pro-B = .235×(PR) + .138×(PR)2 Exp(B) = .80 .89 1.00 1.48 2.19 
Britain (N = 2,368)       
Anti=B = -.255×(PR) Exp(B) = 1.66 1.29 1.00 .77 .60 
Pro-B = .024×(PR) + .165×(PR)2 Exp(B) = 1.85 1.36 1.00 1.43 2.03 
Notes: Moderate (ref. category) 
Exp(B) is the adjusted relative odds ratio calculated from the models in Table 4. 
Model estimates control for other factors. Personal religiosity is a covariate. 
3.4.5 The More Complex Effects of Dutch and British Religiosity  
The calculations for the Netherlands indicate that the combination of linear and quadratic terms translates in a 
straightforward way to a stronger positive effect of personal religiosity on pro-public-religion attitudes among 
more religious Dutch people compared to those who are ‘neither non-religious nor religious’ (Table 5, ref. group, 
religiously indifferent, pro-B = 0: odds for ‘extremely or very religious’ Dutch people, 1.00:2.19 [pro-B = 
+.784**]). The parallel calculations for Britain produces a similar result for pro-public-religion attitudes among 
more religious Britons (Table 5, odd for ‘extremely or very religious’ British people, 1.00:2.03 [pro-B = 
+.708**]) but a very different result for non-religious Britons. British people who say that they are ‘extremely or 
very non-religious’ appear to be polarized in their attitudes about pubic religion. Not only are they more likely to 
be anti-public-religion (Table 5, odds 1.00:1.66 [anti-B = +.510**]) but also they are more likely to be 
pro-public-religion (Table 5, odds 1.00:1.84 [pro-B = +.612**]) compared to religiously indifferent Britons. We 
do not see that distinctive British curvilinear effect in the other countries. Unlike the religiously indifferent in 
British society who do not have strong views either way some secular Britons may support the idea of religious 
leaders making pronouncements about politics as part of a general principle of tolerance towards all groups 
while others in the secular camp dismiss public religion as dangerous intrusion. 
3.4.6 Christian Identity 
As to the potential effects that claiming a Christian identity has on attitudes about public religion – that is, once 
one has allowed for the religious institutional component of church attendance, and also, for the individual’s 
personal religiosity, irrespective of whether or not they go to church – we find that nominal Christians in the 
Netherlands and France are less likely to hold anti-public-religion attitudes compared to Dutch and French 
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people who have no religion (Table 4, ref. group ‘no religion’, anti-B = 0: Dutch Christians, anti-B = -.364** and 
French Christians, anti-B = -.409**). In terms of pro-public-religion attitudes, however, being Christian does not 
have a statistically significant effect in the Netherlands or France. A Christian identity appears to have has no 
effects at all in Denmark. The case of the significance of a Christian identity in Britain appears more complex, 
and so, is re-analyzed. 
3.4.7 Christian Identity in Britain 
The results in Table 4 show Christian identity matters for attitudes in France and the Netherlands but not 
Denmark. Britain is different again. To elaborate on that difference, Christians in Britain were separated out into 
those who identified with a specific religious denomination (N = 1,051) and those who described themsleves as 
Christians but did not identify with any particular religion (N = 206). The proportion of participants who 
identified as Christians of no denomination doubled to over nine percent of the British sample in 2008 compared 
to 1998 (Chi-sq.(1) = 22.16, p < .001). Almost all ISSP participants in the other countries preferred to identify 
with a religious denomination or else to state they had ‘no religion’. The British regression analysis was re-run 
with two dummy variables instead of one for Christian identity, namely: first dummy variable, ‘Denominational 
Christians’ compared to ‘no religion’; and second, ‘Christians of no denomination’ compared to ‘no religion’. 
That new procedure caused no technical issues of note in re-running the analysis. The new regression model 
reproduced the main features of the previous British model except that a Christian identity was now a statistically 
significant factor but only among nominal Christians of no denomination (Ref. group ‘no religion’, pro-B = 0: 
British ‘Christians of no denomination’, pro-B = +.507*, p = .049; and British ‘Denominational Christians’, pro-B 
= +.264, p = .156). What seemed to be more important in Britain was identifying as a Christian without 
necessarily belonging to any religion. As previously, unlike the effects of that imagined Christian identity, 
statistically speaking, churchgoing was not such a factor in the British populace’s attitudes about religious leaders’ 
attempts to become involved in politics, while self-professed religiosity had a more positive effect and secular 
irreligiousness a more complex split effect on attitudes about public religion in Britain. 
3.4.8 Religious-Christians outside the Churches 
The constituency of ‘religious-Christians’ outside of the churches (ISSP participants who say they are personally 
‘religious’ and also a ‘Christian’ but who are not churchgoers) is sizeable in the Netherlands, Britain and France: 
they represent 18.7 percent (n=665) of the Dutch, 18.6 percent (n=483) of the British and 14.2 percent (n=472) 
of the French samples in our analysis. Indeed, numbers of Dutch religious-Christians who are not regular 
churchgoers went up from 16 percent in 1998 to 23 percent in 2008. Religious-Christian numbers outside the 
churches stayed much the same in Britain and France in 2008 compared to 1998. The distinction does not fit the 
Danish case of ‘belonging without believing’vii 
Compared to our reference category of the wholly secular (those ISSP participants who say they are not religious, 
belong to no religion and are not churchgoers) additional calculations based on the regression models in Table 4 
give estimates of the relative odds of Dutch, British and French religious-Christians outside the churches holding 
anti-public-religion attitudes as reduced to less than one-half of the figure for secular people (odds ratio = 
1.00:0.45; 1:.00:0.46; 1.00:0.21, respectively) and of them holding pro-public-religion attitudes as more than 
double the figure for secular people in the Netherlands (odds ratio = 1.00:2.56) and France (odds-ratio = 
1.00:2.06) while such differences in pro-public-religion attitudes as are less marked in Britain (odds ratio = 
1.00:1.45). Differences between religious-Christians and secular people are statistically insignificant in Denmark. 
Our data show that the majority of Dutch, British and French religious-Christians outside of the churches are not 
against public religion, although we also find that only a minority of the constituency hold pro-public-religion 
attitudes in each of the three countries.  
3.5 A Final Caution 
Glendinning and Bruce (2011: 514) had found that people of ‘other’ religions were less likely to be sympathetic 
to public religion in Britain in 2008 compared to 1998. That cautions against readymade assumptions about 
growing public prominence of religion. To re-emphasize that point, when Muslim ISSP participants were asked 
what they thought about mixing religion and politics in the present study, the majority view in the Netherlands, 
Britain, France and Denmark in 2008 was to disapprove of religious leaders’ attempts to influence government 
decision-making. Only 18.5 percent (5 of 27), 25.6 percent (10 of 39), 22.2 percent (4 of 18) and 20.0 percent (2 
of 5) of Muslims from the Dutch, British, French and Danish ISSP samples, respectively, supported the idea of 
religious leaders attempting to influence government decisions in 2008. Desire for de-privatization does not 
seem strong among Muslim constituencies either.   
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4. Discussion 
The idea of mixing religion with politics was popular neither in 1998 nor 2008. In relative terms 
pro-public-religion attitudes were more prevalent among the Dutch and British ISSP samples, but only insofar as 
Dutch and British participants held moderate attitudes rather than expressing outright support for public religion. 
Negative attitudes increased in the Netherlands and positive attitudes declined in Britain in 2008 compared to 
1998. There was less support and clear antipathy among the populace in France, and in Denmark especially, and 
pro-public-religion attitudes were even less likely in France and Denmark in 2008. That all squares with the 
central tenet of secularization concerning the separation of religion from public affairs (Wilson, 1982) but 
following different trajectories in different European countries (Martin, 1978). 
The study found those national trends in changing attitudes applied equally to all religious blocs in each country. 
Dutch churchgoers, for example, were more likely to express negative attitudes in 2008 than they had been in 1998. 
There was no evidence of further growth in the divide between secular and Christian blocs found by Achterberg and 
colleagues (2009) in their analysis of Dutch attitudes from 1970 to the mid-1990s, but then, the proportion of 
nominal Christians as opposed to committed churchgoing Christians had increased in the Netherlands between 
1998 and 2008. Secular – Christian divides in attitudes about pubic religion were unchanged also in France in 2008 
compared to 1998 where proportions of nominal Christians remained stable. Christian identity was not a factor in 
Denmark, and as our analysis has shown, its effects were more complex in Britain. 
Which leaves the study’s central issue: which religious constituencies actually support public religion? In terms 
of majority support the answer is none in any of the countries, including Muslims. We can instead identify those 
national religious constituencies where majorities were not necessarily against public religion and where in 
relative terms members were more likely to express pro-public religion attitudes compared to their fellow 
citizens. In that more moderate sense Dutch and French churchgoing Christians were most likely to be positive 
about public religion. In the Danish case, even inside the Folk Church, the majority of churchgoers were against 
pubic religion. Denmark seemed a special case of ‘belonging without believing’ (Storm, 2009) where 
membership of the Folk Church was bound up with national pride and lack of pluralism as part of Danish 
cultural identity (Jenkins, 2008). Nonetheless, the Danish Lutheran tradition clearly sees it as inappropriate for 
religion to become mixed up in politics. 
Churchgoing does not appear to matter much in Britain but personal religiosity and Christian identity seems 
more important for pro-public-religion attitudes in part reminiscent of Grace Davie’s (1994) original view that 
religion would remain socially significant outside of the churches. The present study identifies two forms. The 
first form manifests as a distinctive British Christian minority who do not belong to any religious denomination, 
a form absent in our analysis of survey data for the other countries. That minority seems to express 
pro-public-religion attitudes as part of an ‘imagined Christian community’ which coheres around ideas of 
ethnic-cultural ‘Englishness’ and nationhood (Anderson, 1991). Membership of that constituency doubled in 
2008 compared to 1998. It is a peculiarly British instance of Christian ‘cultural defence’ (Bruce, 2011). 
The second combination of Christian identity and personal religiosity is not restricted to Britain and represents 
the individual’s break from regular collective practice rather than any break from belonging framed as being 
Christian. There is a requirement that members are ‘moderately religious’ (Storm, 2009), unlike the first 
specifically British form of religio-ethnic national identity (Storm, 2011b) Dutch, British and French 
‘religious-Christians’ represent sizeable residual constituencies outside of the churches who may still be prepared 
to listen to religious leaders’ public pronouncements but without any strong desire for de-privatization. Members 
express relatively positive attitudes about public religion. 
Dutch religious-Christian numbers increased in 2008 compared to 1998 along with claims to a Christian identity 
and self-reports of occasional church attendance, which is our second instance of cultural defence. However, 
reassertions of Christian identity and traditions did not translate into a stronger desire for de-privatization. The 
likelihood of anti-public-religion sentiment increased among all Dutch religious constituencies in 2008 
compared to 1998, including the constituency of religious-Christians. That is despite the Netherlands being the 
‘site of Europe’s most draconian retreat from multiculturalism’ (Joppke, 2009: 1). Perhaps Dutch Christian 
concerns have been assuaged (Vollaard, 2013). 
We cannot know if our two questions about mixing religion and politics were answered by ISSP participants by 
reference to ‘their own’, ‘other’ or ‘all’ religious leaders and whether disagreement with them refers to 
participants’ approval of religious leaders’ involvement in public affairs, or else tolerance of religious leaders 
expressing their opinions, on principle, as part of a more general liberal position about democratic rights in 
secular societies. The differences we find between the four countries are congruent with differing forms of 
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liberalism, religion-state relations and responses to the religious ‘other’ within those national traditions, but in 
the end we find only weak support for de-privatization among religious constituencies in Western Europe. We 
find instances of cultural defence among two constituencies where membership has increased – Dutch 
religious-Christians outside the churches and British nominal Christians of no religion– but those constituencies 
follow the national trend in their respective countries of relative increase in Dutch anti-public-religion attitudes 
and relative decline in British pro-public-religion attitudes. 
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Notes 
                                                        
i
 Ingrid Strom (2009) pursued the point about residual involvement by means of a multivariate analysis using nine 
dimensions of individual religiosity to differentiate among religious constituencies. Discounting religious and secular people, 
four sub-types were identified among survey data from the Netherlands, Britain, Denmark and seven other European 
countries: first, the ‘moderately religious’ 13 percent of the total sample; second, the ‘passively religious’ 9 percent; third, 
those ‘belonging without believing’ 11 percent; and fourth, those ‘believing without belonging’ 9 percent. The ‘religiously 
indifferent’ represent a further sub-type beyond the wholly secular in our own analysis, theoretically distinct from secular 
people who are self-consciously irreligious. 
ii Data were lacking for France. 
iii There are few repeat questions available from social surveys at different time points which allow us to compare the 
populace’s attitudes about the public presence of religion in different Western European societies. 
iv  In our multivariate analyses we do not include ISSP respondents of ‘other religions’ (n=495, 3.7%).given the 
heterogeneous nature of that group, incorporating diverse religions, and with small numbers available for analyses. And note 
the cautionary concluding paragraph of the findings section. 
v Table 1 reports on another analysis to check whether or not each participants’ replies to the two separate questions (a) and 
(b) can be combined together to form a more reliable measure of attitudes. Analysis is broken down by country and year. 
Replies can be combined everywhere (because alpha > .7). The attitude scale has range 1 to 5 and is positively skewed 
towards negative attitudes, more so in 2008 compared to 1998 (Table 1, skewness 1.32 in 2008 and 1.04 in 1998). 
vi Checks were made for multicollinearity among explanatory factors (see Table 4, penultimate row). 
vii Most Danes are ‘Lutherans’ who ‘attend occasionally’ but without being ‘religious’ (Jenkins 2008). 
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